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ABSTRACT
Technological progress is typically a result of trial-and-error research by competing firms. While some
research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from
their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead-end findings. Time
and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be dead ends. Consequently,
technological progress is slowed down, and the society benefits from innovations with delay, if ever.
To study this prevalent problem, we build a tractable two-arm bandit model with two competing firms.
The risky arm could potentially lead to a dead end and the safe arm introduces further competition
to make firms keep their dead-end findings private. We characterize the equilibrium in this decentralized
environment and show that the equilibrium necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful
dead-end replication and a flight to safety – an early abandonment of the risky project. Finally, we
design a dynamic mechanism where firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their
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Innovation is a risky process in which the exact path to success is unknown. Therefore,
many potential innovators go through trial-and-error experimentation that leads to high
R&D costs. Pharmaceutical companies oer a typical case in point. According to a
report by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA, 2011),
developing a drug can cost more than $1 billion and take 10 to 15 years. The nal cost
of a drug arises mostly from early failed attempts to develop it. All rms in competition
with each other to develop a particular drug typically follow similar paths: they try out
and then give up on similar compounds due to toxicity or inecacy. Yet, rms do not
reveal to each other their research activities. In particular, they do not share information
about which exploratory paths they have pursued and have been proven to be fruitless.
As a result many rms waste years and millions on projects that their competitors have
already found to be dead ends.
This problem is common and severe in many industries where research progresses
mostly through trial-and-error.1 While an extensive literature on R&D and innovation
focuses on the incentives for and the impacts of successful innovations, this paper turns
to the dark side of the picture and studies the failed innovation attempts that incur
huge costs, both for rms and for society overall. Our goal is to analyze the private
and social values of dead-end research paths and to understand rms' incentives to keep
them private, that is, to not reveal dead-end paths to their competitors. In addition, we
want to discuss a mechanism that can potentially undo this ineciency.
Duplicative R&D eorts have attracted attention both in academic and industrial
spheres (see, Kortum, 1993; Tufts Report, 2009). Delving deeper into the details of
the modern drug research process would help us understand the problem of duplication
better. PhRMA (2011) describes the process in great detail. The research for a drug
typically starts with the scientic diagnosis of the proteins causing a disease. Often, the
aim of the sought-after drug is to inhibit some protein activity causing the physiological
harm or to stimulate some protein activity that is missing. The next step is to discover
a chemical that will bind to the target protein either to inhibit it or to help it function
as it normally should. This is where the trial-and-error procedure starts. Companies
try out about 5,000 to 10,000 chemical compounds (drug candidates) to see if they bind
to the target protein. Once the promising drug candidates are identied, preclinical
testing starts. Out of those thousands of candidates, only about 250 make it to the
1We will nevertheless mostly refer to pharmaceutical research, to simplify the exposition.
1preclinical stage, while the rest are simply recorded in the company's private database.
The successful subset of candidates is tested on animals (as well as pregnant animals
to test the eect on pregnancy2), for toxicity and ecacy. Out of those 250 chemicals,
approximately 5 successfully move on to the clinical trials stage, in which they are tested
on human beings. For the ones that pass those clinical trials successfully, the company
les a New Drug Approval application with the Food and Drug Administration. This
whole process takes about 10 to 15 years and can cost more than $1 billion, most of which
are clearly spent on the trial-and-error eorts, according to PhRMA (2011). These are
only the accounting costs on the rms' balance sheets. The economy endures further
cost such as delayed cures for the patients and a slowdown in the growth of the entire
sector.
Two key features distinguish the above R&D process from the ones considered by
the literature to date. First, if we think about each of the initial drug candidates as
a research line in itself, it becomes clear that this line could lead to a good outcome
or to a dead end. The existence of a positive reward of a particular research line is
highly uncertain. Second, a rm's research activities are condential and the dead-
end outcomes are kept private within the rm because of competitive pressures, even
though society would benet from their revelation. Publicizing a dead-end outcome
makes the research line obsolete for everyone, while disclosing private actions provides
valuable indirect inference to the opponents. These two features make this type of R&D
competition unique and dierent from the previous R&D models in the literature in
which typically the existence of a positive outcome is certain, although its arrival rate
is stochastic. These two aforementioned new features will be the building blocks of our
analysis, and we will ask the following related questions: What are the implications of
the two features on rms' innovation strategies? What is the cost of sharing information
to a company that has discovered that a particular project is a dead end? What are the
potential ineciencies in an R&D competition setup in which rms do not disclose their
failed attempts? What could be a mechanism to improve eciency? These questions are
central to policy debates on intellectual property rights and R&D. Part of our agenda is
to construct a tractable model that could lay the micro foundation for an endogenous
growth model with asymmetric information.
To study the aforementioned questions, we build a parsimonious two-arm bandit
2This entails a non-material cost that is dicult to measure in dollars. These tests on pregnant
animals including monkeys have been opposed by many groups, and scientists have been trying to
develop alternative, potentially more costly (in monetary terms), testing methodologies.
2model with two asymmetric rms that dier in their arrival rates of innovation. Each
rm can research at most one research line at a time and has to pay a cost c > 0 per
arrival rate and per unit of time on the research. The arrival of outcomes in both lines
follow Poisson arrival processes. Though the lines share the stochastic nature of outcome
arrivals, they dier in one crucial aspect. The safe research is commonly known to deliver
a one-time lump-sum payo  > 0 upon an outcome arrival. The risky research is ex-
ante more protable, yet has an additional uncertainty. In particular, an outcome in the
risky research upon arrival could be good or bad. A good outcome delivers a one-time
lump-sum payo of  (e.g., market value of a drug), while a bad outcome reveals that the
risky research line is a dead-end, in which case the payo is simply 0: Certain approaches
to the cures of HIV or various cancers are potential examples for the risky research line,
and research on incremental improvements on existing drugs are examples of the safe
research line. The lump-sum payo associated with the good outcome arises from the
publicly observable patent for that particular drug and the resulting monopoly power
for that market. We ignore consumers' payos in this analysis of rm competition, the
inclusion of which would only strengthen our results on eciency loss.
Firms share a common prior on the probability of the risky research arm being good.
Both rms start on this risky research line. If the arriving outcome is good, the rm
obtains a publicly observable payo . However, if the outcome is a dead end, the rm
quits this research arm and switches to safe research. The key feature in this case is that
the rival cannot observe the rm's switching action. Therefore rms form belief both on
the nature of the risky arm and the rival's position. The rival may continue with its own
research without knowing that the arm is a dead end. This is the rst ineciency that
emerges in our model. We call this the dead-end ineciency. The second ineciency
arises due to equilibrium belief updating. At any point in time, three events can occur
in a rm: the rm (i) receives a good outcome and patents it, (ii) receives a bad
outcome and secretly quits, (iii) does not receive any outcome. Since only the rst case
is observable to a competitor, when a rm does not observe any outcome from its rival,
it will update downwards its belief about the success of the research arm. As a result, a
rm could eventually quit the research line and switch to the safe research, even though
it has neither itself discovered any outcome, nor observed any patent from its rival. This
will be a second channel of ineciency, in the case where the research arm is actually a
good arm. We call this the early-switching ineciency.
Note that our framework features both private actions and private outcomes. Hence
the solution of the model requires keeping track of two payo-relevant beliefs: one about
3the nature of the risky research and another about the position of the competitor. We
achieve the tractability in this environment by focusing on a pure strategy equilibrium.
We characterize a pure strategy equilibrium and show that it is unique if the game
features enough asymmetry across the rms and the research lines. We identify the
aforementioned ineciencies in this environment and nd that the asymmetric rms
generate dierent ineciencies. While both rms endure dead-end ineciency, only
the weak rm (the rm with a lower arrival rate) creates early-switching ineciency.
Our model suggests that a seemingly negligible amount of competition on the safe arm
generates a drastic welfare loss. Next, we propose a dynamic mechanism that could
undo these ineciencies. This mechanism involves a third party that collects monetary
installments, ex-ante, and rewards the report of failed attempts as time progresses in
an incentive-compatible way. As a result, rms are incentivized to participate in the
mechanism at any point in time, share their dead-end ndings without any delay upon
their discovery, and follow the rst-best decision rules. The basic idea we try to convey is
that we should also consider rewarding the failed attempts in order to improve eciency.
Our paper thus complements and contrasts with the literature on patents for successful
innovations as a reward mechanism. Notice that while private industries currently
reward only protable, positive outcomes, \patents for dead-end discoveries" already
exist in many academic professions that publish the impossibility results.3
We view our main objectives in this paper as follows. First, the economic problem
we consider here is a general one that applies to many industries and has signicant
welfare implications. We hope that our paper would draw attention to this practical
and fundamental problem and would promote further investigations on implementable
institutional design to remedy this problem. Second, our tractable model can serve
as a workhorse for further investigations and can be enriched to consider alternative
environments. We oer more details on this in the conclusion. In what follows, we will
place our paper in the literature and elaborate our contributions in more details.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the broad literature on R&D races. The type of duplication
that arises in that literature is very dierent from the duplication we capture here.
For instance, Harris and Vickers (1985, 1987); Aghion et al. (2001); Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2011) consider an R&D competition model in which the technology gap between
3We thank Matthew Jackson for pointing this out to us.
4the competing rms is endogenously determined through the R&D investments of the
leader and follower. While the technology leader's successful R&D pushes forward the
technology frontier, the follower's successful R&D eort replicates the steps that were
previously already taken by the leader. As a result, the follower's R&D eort is spent
on wasteful duplications. In our model, competing rms replicate each other's dead-end
results as opposed to the successful ndings, and the R&D race is ecient as long as
private information is made public.
There are related R&D race models with social learning. Chatterjee and Evans
(2004) oer a fully dynamic two-arm bandit model of R&D rivalry.4 In their model,
exactly one of the two arms contains a prize but rms do not know which one. In
contrast to our central focus here, there is no dead-end discovery in the paper. As a
result, searching is always desirable and the issue of dead-end replication does not arise.
Moreover, they assume that both actions and outcomes are perfectly observable. As
they stated, the central trade-o is that an agent wants to take a dierent arm from
his opponent to reduce the possibility of simultaneous discovery (which leads to a low
payo due to Bertrand competition), while doing so increases the chance of leaving the
opponent exploiting the correct arm. In contrast, the central trade-o in our model is
very dierent. Simultaneous discovery is not an issue in our continuous-time context,
and it is precisely the private observations and private strategies in conjunction with
competition that drive our results. Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) investigate a two-
stage model in which two agents simultaneously rank a nite set of boxes, exactly one
of which contains a prize, and subsequently commit to opening the boxes according
to that order.5 In this model, the central theme is that an agent wants to preempt
his opponent by opening a box before his opponent. Since players face the same set
of boxes and the search order is chosen once and for all, an equilibrium must involve
randomization over the orders of boxes. As a result of randomization, the most likely
box is not searched rst. There is indeed dead-end outcome in this model, but due to its
static nature, dead-end information is irrelevant and the model does not have a learning
element at all. Moscarini and Squintani (2010) consider a one-arm bandit competitive
experimentation model with publicly observable stopping decisions and initial private
information. There is no information arrival and hence no dead-end discovery either,
4See also Bhattacharya, Chatterjee and Samuelson (1986) for a model of dynamic adoption of in-
novation with Gaussian signals where rms observe each other's actions. This paper thus precedes the
bandit literature that deals with observable actions and private signals which we shall discuss shortly.
5In their model, agents could also choose to group several boxes together and the group size is also
a choice variable.
5but interesting social learning takes place from observing the opponent staying in the
game, and a quitting decision of the opponent also reveals his initial private signals.6
Both our motivation and our model dier from theirs. In our two-arm bandit model,
actions and the (bad) outcome are private, and it is the competitive incentive on the
safe arm and new information arrival that aect the experimentation and learning on
the risky arm.
In this paper, we study the social value of failed attempts and suggest a dynamic
mechanism to also reward the failed attempts in order to prevent wasteful duplication of
dead-end projects. Our paper thus complements the literature on patents as a reward
mechanism to successful innovations. The main purpose of a patent is to provide ex-
post monopoly power so that agents can engage in costly innovation eorts ex-ante (e.g.,
Arrow (1962); Reinganum (1982); Scotchmer (1991); Aghion and Howitt (1992)). The
main focus in this literature has been the trade-o between the length and width of
the patent protection. Acemoglu, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar (2011) consider a model in
which rms receive private signals on the success probability of research projects and
decide which one to implement. They show that patents can prevent inecient delays.
In an R&D race model, Acemoglu and Akcigit (2011) numerically show that the design
of intellectual property rights can be used to provide additional incentives by providing
stronger protections to the more advanced innovators. Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2011)
take a mechanism design approach and completely characterize the optimal mechanism
in a model with recurrent innovators. See also Kremer (1998), Hopenhayn, Llobet and
Mitchell (2006) and Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2011) for related investigations.
Finally, our paper contributes to the strategic bandit literature.7 Multi-agent ex-
perimentation in teams has been studied in Bolton and Harris (1999); Keller, Rady,
and Cripps (2005); Strulovici (2010), and Bonatti and H orner (2011). Klein and Rady
(2011) also consider a negatively correlated two-arm bandit problem. Free-riding is a
common feature in these models. This leads to an inecient level of experimentation
and often mixed strategy equilibria. In contrast, in our model, we focus on applica-
tions with a winner-takes-all competition. The only observable event is one's rival's
success, which lowers one's payo. Therefore the free-riding motive does not emerge
in our model. Our model also diers from Thomas (2011). In her model, two players
share a safe option that can be taken by at most one player at a time, and each player
6Murto and V alim aki (2011) study a related social learning model with common payos.
7See Bergemann and V alim aki (2008) for a survey. See also Moscarini and Smith (2001) for their
treatment of a single decision maker bandit problem and its connection with R&D models.
6has an independent risky option. Interestingly, the congestion on the safe arm leads to
inecient experimentation on the risky option. Similar to the previous studies, there
is no dead-end information in her model, and both actions and outcomes are publicly
observable. Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2007); Hopenhayn and Squintani (2011); and
Murto and V alim aki (2011) consider bandit problems in which outcomes are not ob-
servable but actions are. In our paper, we consider a two-arm bandit problem in which
the actions are unobservable, and outcomes are only partially observable. As a result,
rms have to form beliefs both about their rivals' actions and about the existence of a
positive risky payo. The inecient level of learning and experimentation is not due to
free-riding; rather it is due to uncertainty about the type of an opponent's discovery,
if any. We need to emphasize that in free-riding bandit papers, early switching is due
to the assumption that no news is bad news, while in our model, it arises endogenously
through competition { in fact, our model does not generate early switching under perfect
information. Another contrast to most of the two-arm bandit models is that the safe
arm in our model features stochastic arrival; this plays an important role as the arrival
could reveal information about a rm's past private observation on the risky arm, which
makes the two arms correlated through this information channel.
More importantly, the aforementioned strategic bandit models study xed games
with specic assumptions on observability of actions and outcomes. Our paper is the
rst one to take a mechanism design approach to study ecient information sharing in
a bandit environment.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3 outlines the model. Section
4 characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized market. Section 5 provides a numerical
example. Section 6 studies the mechanism design for information sharing. Section 7
concludes and also provides a discussion of potential extensions.
3 Model
Research experimentation is an intrinsically dynamic process. Private outcomes and
private actions complicate equilibrium belief formation, especially in the presence of
stochastic arrivals on both arms. In the sequel, we attempt to oer the simplest possible
model that captures the essence of the central trade-os in such market environments.
73.1 Basic Environment
There are two rms in the economy that engage in research competition in continuous
time and maximize their present values with a discount rate r > 0:
Firms can compete on two alternative research lines: safe and risky. Each rm can
do research on at most one line at a time. For our purpose, we assume rms start the
game with a competition on the risky arm.8 The arrival of outcomes in both lines follow
Poisson arrival processes. The safe research is commonly known to deliver a one-time
lump-sum payo  > 0 upon an outcome arrival. The risky research has an additional
uncertainty besides stochastic arrival. An outcome in the risky research upon arrival
could be good or bad. A good outcome delivers a one-time lump-sum payo of , while
a bad outcome reveals that the risky research line is a dead end, in which case the payo
is simply 0: Firms share a common prior 0 2 (0;1) on the risky research being good.
Assumption 1 The risky research is ex-ante more protable than the safe research:

0 > :
The two rms dier in their R&D productivities, which are captured in our model
by heterogeneous Poisson arrival rates of a discovery. In particular, rm n 2 f1;2g
has an arrival rate of n > 0 independent of the research line, and has to pay a cost
nc > 0 per unit of time. We assume 1 < 2: We hence call them weak and strong
rms, respectively. We shall write   1 + 2 as the total arrival rate of both rms.9
At time t; a rm can choose one of three options: (1) research on the risky line (2)
research on the safe line, or (3) exit the game with 0 payo. A rm can change its actions,
but it cannot return to the research line it had left. This irreversibility assumption
simplies the analysis of inference/belief-updating without aecting our main focus; it
comes at a cost: the calculation of continuation payo is more involved.10
8In the online appendix, we extend the model by allowing rms to choose simultaneously at t = 0
which arm to start to with, and in particular, they could start with the safe arm and switch to the risky
arm later. This extension introduces interesting strategic considerations, though they are not directly
related to our motivation.
9The only asymmetry between rms is in terms of their arrival rates. Allowing other asymmetries
would only complicate the analysis without adding new insights. The role of asymmetry is to rule out
coordination equilibria that are not robust. Asymmetry is a realistic condition also from an empirical
point of view.
10Reversibility usually does not play any role in stopping games such as in Bonatti and H orner (2011).
This is not the case in our model, because the players in our game have three options; players' payos
depend on the arms they choose and the stochastic arrival reveals information. Dierent versions of
irreversibility assumptions appear elsewhere in the literature such as Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille
8The rm's research activity is private and unobservable to the public. However, a
successful discovery is public.11 Therefore, a rm is uncertain of which research line its
competitor is working on and whether the risky research line has been found to be a
dead end, unless it received an arrival on the risky research line or observed a patent by
the competitor.
For the purpose of formal analysis, we endow the continuous-time game with two
private stages k = 0;1 for each rm. This is an adoption of the \public stage" idea
proposed by Murto and V alim aki (2011) into our setup with unobservable actions to
overcome the well-known modelling issue in continuous time.12
The game starts at stage 0: In the (common) stage 0; rm n takes the risky research
and chooses a stopping time Tn;0 2 [0;+1] at the beginning of this stage. The inter-
pretation is that rm n intends to stay on the risky research line until Tn;0 as long as
nothing happens.
The game proceeds to stage 1 for rm n at time t = Tn;0 or when new information
arrives to rm n. New information takes one of the following three forms:
1. rm n makes a discovery on the risky research arm,
2. rm n observes a good-outcome discovery from its competitor on the risky arm,
and
3. rm n observes a discovery from its competitor on the safe arm.
In our game, once an outcome is discovered on a research line, no further positive
payos will be derived from it. Note that stage 1 is rm n's private stage, because it
could be potentially triggered by a private dead-end observation.
(2007); Murto and V alim aki (2011); and Acemoglu, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar (2011).
11For example, this could be because a patent is needed for a rm to receive the positive lump-sum
payo. Note that in our model, a priori, the incentive for delaying a patent might emerge. Strategic
patenting will be one of the extensions to our model discussed in Section 7.
12We allow a rm to react immediately, without a lag, to new information it obtains either by making
discovery on its own, or observing potential good discoveries by its opponent. This creates a well-
known modelling issue of timing of events in continuous time. The standard approach adopted in the
exponential bandit literature is to focus on Markov strategies that depend on the beliefs over the risky
arm, which leads to well-dened outcomes and evolution of beliefs. This approach will not resolve the
diculty in our model with three actions, as a rm's decision not only depends on its assessment of the
risky research line, but also on the availability of its outside options in a winner-takes-all competition.
For instance, the discovery by the opponent on either research line will not stop the game immediately,
but obviously aects the continuation game. Moreover, in a multiple-arm problem with irreversibility,
we need to keep track of the arms that have been visited in the past (this is not necessary in a one-arm
problem, as switching arms ends the game).
9If rm n enters its private stage k = 1 at t = Tn;0 when its stopping time expires
without observing new information arrival, then rm n chooses either \exit" or the \safe
research line" with a stopping time Tn;1. If rm n's private stage k = 1 is triggered by a
new information arrival, rm n chooses either \exit" or an available research line together
with a stopping time Tn;1. Note that there is a dierence between the two cases. In the
latter case, even though new information arrives, rm n can still continue on the risky
arm if it has not abandoned it yet; while in the former case, rm n voluntarily gives up
the risky arm at Tn;0 conditional on no arrival of information.
The game for rm n ends if it ever exits, or at t = Tn;0+Tn;1; or information arrives.
Note that the game only consists of at most two private stages for each rm because an
observable discovery will remove a research line from the choice set. We focus on perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies.13
Below, we summarize the notation that appears frequently in the main text to facil-
itate the reading of the paper.14
Primitives Values
 safe return wSS
n rm n's value from competing on the safe arm
 risky return wSS the joint value from cooperating on the safe arm
0 prior on the good risky arm wS
n rm n's value from monopolizing the safe arm
n rm n's arrival rate wR
n rm n's value from monopolizing the risky arm
 1 + 2 wRR
n the joint value from cooperating on the risky arm
c ow cost per unit of arrival
Beliefs
t
n rm n's beliefs over the risky arm at time t

t
n rm n's period-t belief that rm  n is on the risky arm
bt
n rm n's period-t belief that rm  n is on the risky arm conditional on the arm being bad
Table 1
3.2 The Safe Arm
The core of our idea is that competition in the safe research prevents the disclosure
of socially ecient information regarding the risky research line. To understand the
13In contrast, pure strategy equilibria usually do not exist in bandit problems with free-riding.
14In choosing this notation, the superscript SS indicates there are two rms on the safe arm; the
superscript S indicates only one rm is on the safe arm. The subscript n indicates that the prot is
attributed to rm n:
10dynamics of this competition, and the eects of the existence of the safe research line,
we rst shut down the risky research line and consider only the safe research with
zero outside options { our ndings here will be used later to determine the equilibrium
continuation payos. In the sequel, we characterize the strategic behaviour in three
dierent market structures: monopoly, cooperation, and competition.
3.2.1 Monopoly
Write rm n's monopolistic value from the safe arm as wS
n. Assuming the rm's strategy
is to work on the arm until a discovery is made, we can express wS
n recursively using the
following continuous time Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
w
S
n =  ncdt + e
 rdt 





where the rst term on the right-hand side is the research cost; the second term is the
discounted expected instantaneous return { a lump-sum payo  is received with an
instantaneous probability ndt; the third term is the discounted expected continuation
payo.






(   c): (2)
This expression is intuitive. By working on the research line, rm n derives a payo of
n (   c) per unit of time (ow payo), with eective discounting n + r: From this
expression, the rm will research on the safe arm if  > c:
Assumption 2  > c:
It also transpires from the monotonicity of n
n+r in n that the strong rm enjoys
larger monopolistic prots.
3.2.2 Cooperation
Next, we consider the cooperative scheme in which rms maximize their joint value,
wSS. The HJB equation is
w
SS =  cdt + e
 rdt 
dt + (1   dt)w
SS
:






which is positive under Assumption 2: Comparing this with expression (2), the rms
now work as one team and hence the arrival rate is  = 1 + 2 and the the total ow
cost is c: Since 
+r is strictly increasing in ; all-rm cooperation is welfare improving
over any subset of rms' cooperation, including monopoly as a special case.
3.2.3 Competition
Now consider the winner-takes-all competition between the two rms. Denote rm n's
valuation of the safe research line under competition as wSS
n . Assuming the two rms




n =  ncdt + e
 rdt 





where the third term is the discounted continuation payo upon no discovery by either






(   c): (4)
Comparing with the single-rm case (2); the extra term  n in the denominator repre-
sents an extra discounting resulting from the competition. Once again, rm n's strategy
is optimal if Assumption 2 holds. It is clear that wSS
n < wS
n; meaning that the competi-
tion lowers a rm's payo. Note that wSS = wSS
n +wSS
 n is the sum of rms' value under
competition. The following proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 1 When the research line has known return, competition is ecient.
4 Equilibrium Analysis of the Model
Now we turn to the full two-arm bandit model and analyze dynamic competition with two
research lines. We again proceed with three market structures: monopoly, cooperation,
and competition.
124.1 Monopoly
If rm n has only the risky research line available, then its monopolistic value can be
found using the HJB equation
w
R
n =  ncdt + e
 rdt 
ndt





Note that there is no belief updating in the monopolistic problem. Hence wR
n =
n
n+r (0   c): If rm n has only the safe research line available, then similarly its
monopolistic value is wS
n = n
n+r (   c):
Now when the single rm n has two research lines, it will choose when to switch to
the safe research line. Firm n's monopolistic value is given by the HJB equation,













n on the right-hand side is the expected lump-sum payo upon an arrival:
rm n receives 0 from the risky research and wS
n from monopolizing the safe research


















This expression is intuitive. Firm n's expected monopolistic prot from the risky research
line is wR
n; and it also receives the monopolistic prot wS
n from the safe research line with
an arrival rate of n and an eective discount rate of n + r:
4.2 Cooperation: Planner's Problem
We now consider the case in which rms behave cooperatively to maximize joint value.
Several observations are in order.
1. Firms should share all the information to avoid wasteful research eorts.
2. Let wSS and wRR be the joint value of the two rms if they work only on the safe















13By Assumptions 1{2, we have wRR > wSS > 0:
The planner's strategy space is larger than the monopolist's problem. In particular,
the problem involves the optimal allocation of joint eorts. Therefore, a more interesting
question is how to allocate the joint eorts, and in particular, whether splitting the
research lines between the two rms is more desirable. We shall show that the rst best
allocation of eorts requires that both rms work on the risky arm until a discovery
is made (which is made public immediately) and then both switch to the safe arm.
Splitting the task is never optimal.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1{2, the strategy that maximizes joint value is for
both rms to work on the risky arm together until a discovery is made, and then both



















The interpretation of the joint value under this strategy is as follows: Recall that
wRR is the joint value of researching only on the risky research until an outcome is found.
When the rms follow a strategy of researching on the risky arm and then switching to
the safe arm upon discovery, this also adds the continuation value of the safe research on
top of wRR: A discovery on the risky arm arrives at the rate  and the rm's continuation
payo from the safe research upon arrival is simply wSS:
Remark In fact, the proof of Proposition 2 shows that the strategy is optimal even
without the restriction that both rms start with the risky arm.
4.3 Competition in a Decentralized Market
When it comes to competition, which research line a rm is working on is private infor-
mation and only the good discovery is observable. We now highlight how the ingredients
in our model aect the learning dynamics.
14First, we model two types of outcomes because such a model is more applicable to
the prevalence of trial-and-error types of research competition.15 Uncertainty about the
type of an opponent's discovery is crucial for our learning dynamics generated by the
dead-end discoveries.
Second, the independence of the arrival rates in the binary states implies that there
will be no belief updating if research activities and dead-end ndings are public. As
a result, non-trivial belief updating is entirely driven by the unobservability of dead-
end discoveries and private research actions. This is precisely the focus of our analysis.
Moreover, this independence assumption implies that eciency is attainable under per-
fect information but not otherwise. Hence, the independence assumption isolates and
highlights the trade-o in the applications of our main interest.16
Third, arrival on the safe arm is also stochastic, which aects the learning dynamics
indirectly. Upon observing an opponent's discovery on the safe arm, a rm can make
an inference about the opponent's potential past observations on the risky arm, and the
extent of this inference in equilibrium turns out to depend crucially on the timing of the
safe arm discovery. The observational structure in our model is mixed. Actions are not
observable unless they lead to a good discovery, but at that point, the competition on
that arm is ended.
We shall now demonstrate how learning takes place.
4.3.1 Learning and Private Beliefs
Write t
n as rm n's private belief that the risky research line contains a good outcome
at time t (which obviously depends on the realization of private and public histories).
Write 
t
n as the probability that rm n assigns to his opponent, rm  n; being on the
risky arm at time t. Denote by bt
n the probability that rm n assigns to his opponent
being on the risky arm at time t conditional on the fact that the risky arm is bad.
Suppose both rms start on the risky arm, and switch only upon an observation. If
rm n does not observe anything { neither from itself, nor from its opponent { from t
15The existing exponential bandit models have only a single outcome, for instance, Keller, Rady, and
Cripps (2005), Bonatti and H orner (2011), Strulovici (2010), Murto and V alim aki (2011), and Klein
and Rady (2010).
16We discuss the relaxation of this assumption in the conclusion.
15to t + dt; rm n will update t





n (1    ndt)(1   ndt)
t
n (1    ndt)(1   ndt) + (1   t




n (1    ndt)
t
n (1    ndt) + (1   t
n)[1   (1   bt
n) ndt]
:
Note that the nal expression is independent of (1   ndt); that is to say, rm n does
not learn from the fact that it does not observe anything from its own research. This is
because the arrival rate n is independent of the type of the outcomes (see the discussion
above).
The interpretation for the second equality above is as follows. The numerator mea-
sures the probability that the opponent does not make a (public) discovery and the risky
arm is good. The denominator measures the probability that rm n does not observe any-
thing from its opponent { when the risky research is a dead end, the only observable dis-
covery from its opponent is on the safe arm, which occurs with probability (1   bt
n) ndt;
and hence the probability of observing nothing from  n is 1   (1   bt
n) ndt:














The critical feature of the learning is that when the opponent discovers faster, i.e.,
 n is larger, then rm n learns faster. The intuition is as follows. As  n increases, the
opponent will discover an outcome on the risky research sooner. Therefore, if no good
outcome is observed from the opponent over a xed period of time, it is more likely that
the opponent actually found a dead end. Therefore, everything else equal, the weak rm
becomes more pessimistic than the strong rm on the risky research over time with no
discovery.
If rm n knows that a bad (dead-end) outcome has arrived before t, then t
n = 0; if
n knows that the good outcome has occurred before t; then t
n = 1:
Learning with stopping strategies Suppose both rms work on the risky arm
before T > 0 until a discovery is made. How will the private beliefs evolve? First, at any
t  T; if rm n has not observed anything from its opponent or from its own research,
17To see this, subtract t







e  nt + (1   0) nte  nt =
1
1 + (1   0) nt
: (9)
We need to interpret this formula. e  nt is the probability that the opponent rm  n
does not make any discovery by time t; (1   0) nte  nt is the probability that the
opponent makes one dead-end discovery and that is the only discovery by time t.18 The
denominator in (9) is the total probability of no observation from the opponent, which
consists of two pieces: the probability of no arrival, e  nt; and the probability of only
one private (dead-end) arrival, (1   0) nte  nt: The opponent will stay on the risky
arm only when there is no arrival by t  T: This is reected in the numerator of (9):
Similarly, if rm n has not observed anything from its opponent and from its own










n is conditional on the risky research having a dead end, and hence, (1   0)
is excluded from Bayes' formula (9):













As this formula demonstrates, even though the rate of discovery  n is constant over time
in our model, the rate of learning from no observation,
 n
1+ nt; changes hyperbolically
in time. The following lemma provides the explicit form for the belief.
Lemma 1 Under stopping strategies described above, the belief of rm n at time t  T





1 + (1   0) nt
: (12)
Proof. See Appendix.
Now, consider the case in which rm n has not discovered anything on its own




17research, but observes the opponent's discovery on the safe research at t  T: Given
the stopping strategy rm  n adopts, rm n could infer that the opponent has already
discovered a dead end on risky research previously and has since switched to the safe
research. Therefore, in this case, t
n = 0:
Next, consider the case in which rm n has not discovered anything through its own
research, but observes the opponent's discovery on the safe research at t > T: Then
there is no updating t
n = T
n; and in fact, this observation is valid as long as rm  n
switches at time T; and it does not matter when rm n switches. This observation is











Finally, if rm n has not discovered anything on its own research at t > T; its belief
t
n is still T
n: Note that there is a discontinuity: when rm  n makes a discovery on the
safe research at or before T; then t
n jumps down to 0; while, if the discovery is made
right after T; the belief is constant at T
n, as if nothing had occurred.
With the above discussion as a precursor, Figures 1A and 1B depict the evolution
of beliefs, bt
n and t
n; conditional on no arrival under the following pair of stopping
strategies: until an observation reveals the nature of the risky arm, rm 1 stays on the
risky arm until T > 0; and rm 2 sticks to the risky arm.19
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Time (T = 36)
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Figure 1A: bt
n Figure 1B: t
n
4.3.2 Equilibrium
Recall that we assume rm 1 is weaker than rm 2 in the sense that 1 < 2:
19The parameters come from a numerical example provided in section 5.
18Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1{2, there is a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium in which both rms start on the risky research and switch silently to the safe arm
upon a dead-end discovery. In this equilibrium,
 unless an outcome is observed, the strong rm will not stop, and the weak rm
























 if the rst news that a rm observes from its opponent before T is a good outcome
of the risky research, then both rms switch to the safe research,
 if the rst news that a rm observes from its opponent before T is an outcome on
the safe research, then both rms exit,
 if rm 2 observes a good outcome on the risky research after T; it will switch to
the safe research if it is still available.





1 are large enough, then the above describes the unique pure strategy equilibrium
outcome.
Proof. See Appendix.
In this equilibrium, the weak rm abandons the risky research too early compared to
the rst best scenario in which both rms stay on the risky research until a discovery is
made. Indeed, this is the case even when 1 approaches 2: This equilibrium also reveals
that the two asymmetric rms generate dierent types of ineciencies absent from a
discovery on the safe arm. First, the strong rm generates wasteful duplicative R&D
from the time that the weak rm discovers a failure until it discovers the failure itself or
the weak rm discovers the safe arm before T. Second, the weak rm generates wasteful
R&D only from the time that the strong rm discovers a failure until its switching time
T or the time at which the strong rm discovers the safe arm. Moreover, the weak
rm generates ineciency from the time it switches until the strong rm discovers an
outcome in the risky arm, due to early switching. In short, the weak rm endures two
kinds of ineciencies: early-switching and dead-end ineciencies, while the larger rm
endures only the dead-end ineciency.
19We also want to comment on the role of asymmetry. If rms are symmetric or payos
in both arms are close, we can construct an equilibrium where rms coordinate on who
switches research arms, and mixed strategy equilibria are also possible.
The following proposition provides a comparative statics analysis with respect to the
parameters of the model:
Proposition 3 The equilibrium stopping time T is increasing in 0 and ; and decreas-
ing in 2 and :
Proof. See Appendix.
These comparative statics are intuitive. As 0 and  become larger and  becomes
smaller, the risky arm becomes more attractive. However, when 2 becomes larger, the
weak rm updates its belief downwards faster. The response of T with respect to 1 is
non-monotonic as it aects both the weak rm's payos in both arms simultaneously.
5 Numerical Example
In this section, we provide a numerical analysis of our model, taking pharmaceutical
research competition as an example. Due to the simplicity of the model, our purpose
is not to provide a detailed calibration of it. Our goal is rather to demonstrate the
behaviour and welfare implications of the model, and highlight its general quantitative
features for reasonable parameter values. Our model has 7 parameters: r; 0; ; ; c; 1
and 2: Table 2 summarizes the parameter values. These parameters come from a basic
calibration exercise in which we rely on reports by the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA, 2002-2011). The details of the parameter choices
are described in Appendix D.
Parameter Values (Monthly) and Equilibrium Stopping Time
r 0 1 2 c   T
0.4% 17% 2.6% 6.5% $63 million $1.4 billion $87 million 36 months
Table 2
5.1 Summary Statistics
Given the above parameters, we simulate the decentralized market and planner's problem
500;000 times each. Table 3 summarizes the simulation results.
20Both rms start on the risky arm with an initial belief 0
n = 1=6: As time elapses,
rms receive outcomes according to the Poisson process described above. Note that rm
2 observes an outcome 2.5 times more frequently than the weak rm 1 (2=1). Since
rm 2 receives an outcome faster, its average experimentation time on the risky arm
is shorter by around 13.8 months as opposed to 16.1 months for rm 1. Note that this
is despite the fact that rm 1 follows a cut-o rule according to which it switches to
the safe arm at T = 36 if it does not observe an outcome either by itself or from its
competitor. The associated beliefs under this strategy were already depicted in Figures
1A and 1B.
Comparison of Decentralized and Planner
0s Solutions
Moment Decentralized Planner's
Average time to develop a risky drug 14.9 years 11 years
Average cost to develop a risky drug $499 million $382 million
Fraction of risky drugs invented by rm 1 28% 29%
Average risky experimentation by rm 1 16.1 months 10.9 months
Average risky experimentation by rm 2 13.8 months 10.9 months
Average safe experimentation by rm 1 9.1 months 10.9 months
Average safe experimentation by rm 2 11.7 months 10.9 months
Average wasteful risky research investment by rm 1 9.6 months 0
Average wasteful risky research investment by rm 2 11.4 months 0
Table 3
Figure 2A depicts the distribution for experimentation durations on the risky arm in
each trial. The rst point to note is the spike at t = 35: In almost 12% of the trials, rm
1 does not observe any outcome and follows its equilibrium cut-o strategy, switching
to the safe arm at t = T. Second, compared to rm 1, rm 2's distribution has more
mass at lower durations. This is due to the fact that rm 2 has a faster arrival rate,
which allows it to discover the true nature of the risky arm more quickly. Finally, in
the planner's economy, information sharing increases the eective arrival rate for both
rms (1 + 2): This shifts the distribution of experimentation durations to the left and
hence reduces the average time spent on the risky arm to 10.9 months, which is 32%
and 21% lower than the average experimentation times for rms 1 and 2, respectively.















































































Figure 2A Figure 2B
Next, we study the time that rms spend on risky research between two consecutive
risky drug inventions. Figure 2B plots the results of the simulations. In the decentralized
economy in which rms have private information about their R&D outcomes, rms spend
on average 14.9 years on the risky arm per drug. Note that some of this time is spent
on research in a line that the competitor already knows is a dead end. The planner's
economy avoids this problem, and rms spend 11 years -that is 26% less time- on the
risky arm per drug.
It is also important to understand the sources of ineciencies in the economy. The
decentralized economy diers from the planner's economy in two major dimensions.
First, when a rm discovers a dead end on the risky arm before T; it switches to the safe
arm without sharing this information with the competitor. As a result, the competitor is
wasting R&D dollars on a research line that is already known to be a dead end. This is
what we call the dead-end ineciency. Figure 3A plots the distribution of the number
of periods spent on research in a dead end. Note that the maximum wasteful R&D
by rm 1 has an upper bound of T, due to the cut-o strategy, which mitigates the
welfare loss (however, as will be shown below, this strategy increases the second type
of ineciency). Since rm 2 learns the true nature of the arm faster, rm 1 spends
more time on a dead-end risky arm before T: On the other hand, while rm 2 incurs
wasteful R&D spending less frequently before T; it is the only rm that can potentially
stay longer on a dead-end research line. The average dead-end replication time is 9.6
months for rm 1 and 11.4 for rm 2.
Figure 3B describes the second source of ineciency: early switching. The planner
prefers both rms to experiment until an outcome is found on the risky arm. However,
in the decentralized economy in which rms do not observe the private information of
their competitors, they become pessimistic about the outcome on the risky arm, as time
22elapses. In equilibrium, rm 1 switches to the safe arm at time T even in situations where
rm 2 has not received any information about the risky arm by then: This generates
missing experimentations by rm 1 due to early switching, which are plotted in Figure
3B.














































Missing Experimentations (Early-switching Inefficieny)

























Figure 3A Figure 3B
Finally, we illustrate the monetary cost of the problem in Figure 4, which plots the
distribution of the total amount of R&D dollars spent between two consecutive risky
drugs. In the decentralized economy, rms spend on average $499 million on a risky drug,
a signicant portion of which is wasted due to the two aforementioned ineciencies.
Firms spend on average $382 million in the planner's economy, which is 23% less.





































The following section discusses the sources of these ineciencies in greater detail.
235.2 Types of Ineciencies: Dead End and Early Switching
In this section, we focus on two dierent types of ineciencies demonstrated in our
equilibrium. We consider three regimes: the rst best regime (FB) is the cooperation
setup with information sharing, the decentralization regime (D) is the decentralized
market without information sharing, and the intermediate regime (I) has full information
sharing, but articially requires the weak rm 1 to stop at T, the stopping time in regime
D.
Let us denote the welfare associated with the regime  as W; where  2 fFB;D;Ig:
Therefore, WFB   WI is the welfare loss due to early switching only (excluding the
information externality upon the discovery of bad news), and WI   WD is the welfare
loss due to the information externality { socially ecient information of a dead-end
nding is not disclosed.
From Proposition 2, we know that WFB = wRR + 
+rwSS: Since the intermediate
regime diers from the rst-best regime only after T, we have




















are rm 1's contribution to the total welfare
(measured in ow payos) when rm 1 works on the risky arm and the safe arm, respec-
tively; e T is the probability that a discovery has not been made on the risky research
by T:
Finally, note that the dierence between regime (I) and regime (D) arises only when
the risky research is a dead end. In this case, a dead-end discovery is not observable
to the opponent, unless a subsequent discovery on the safe arm is reported before T:
Therefore, we need again to consider the probability that only one discovery is made by
the same rm n before t; which is given by Pr(one arrival before t) = nte nt: Using
this fact, we obtain20



















The following table summarizes the numerics. Note that rms do not want to share
the dead-end discovery on the risky arm because of the competition on the safe arm,
















24which has a per unit of arrival rate net return    c:
Welfare Analysis















$1 $0.024 m $19.3 m $19.3 m $162.9 m 12%
$1 m $0.026 m $19.5 m $19.6 m $163.8 m 12%
$10 m $0.044 m $21.9 m $22.0 m $172.0 m 13%
$30 m $0.364 m $31.7 m $32.1 m $254.5 m 13%
Table 4
The nding is striking. We notice that even if the net return on the safe arm is only
$1, the incentive of preventing the opponent from competing for this $1 causes a total
eciency loss of $19.3 million, which amounts to 12% of the rst-best welfare level! The
logic, as we have already pointed out, is that this $1 completely changes the incentives to
share private information. Without it, the rm does not lose anything from information
sharing.
Note that the dead-end ineciency is much larger than the early-switching ine-
ciency. We should not be optimistic about the early-switching ineciency. Indeed,
early-switching delays the discovery on the risky arm by almost 4 years for the same
set of parameters as we demonstrated previously. If consumers' welfare is taken into
account in our model, then early-switching will have a much larger implication.
6 Mechanism Design for Ecient Competition
In this section, we shall discuss a mechanism that incentivizes information sharing. The
idea is to create a centralized institution to reward dead-end discoveries. This is the
counterpart of the prevailing practice of rewarding good-end discoveries through patents
and prizes. After all, many professions publish and reward dead-end discoveries and
impossibility results. We focus on the case where outcomes are veriable. Similar to
good outcome patenting where rms prove that their experiments lead to the solution of
a problem (e.g., drug curing a disease), we assume that rms can provide their research
results and data to prove their dead-end ndings (similar to the data policy of academic
journals and proofs of impossibility results). It should be emphasized that we do not
suggest that our mechanism is practical, because, as in the theoretical mechanism design
literature, our mechanism depends on the details of the model; rather, we want to
25investigate theoretically the outreach and the limits of the simple idea of trading dead-
end discoveries.
Remark One important question to answer is why there is a need for a mechanism
designer instead of allowing rms to trade dead-end discoveries in a decentralized
market, or to sign contracts among themselves. This is the core of the classic
problem of information trading, as pointed out by Arrow (1962) in an argument for
patenting through centralized institutions. Information is dierent from standard
commodities. The buyer of information, once the buyer learns the information or
veries it, obtains what he needed in the rst place and has no incentive to pay
anymore. This problem discourages information trading in a decentralized market.
Therefore, a mediator is often necessary for the sale of information.
6.1 Feasible Mechanisms
The mechanism must be dynamic in nature to accommodate the stochastic arrival.
Ideally, a dynamic mechanism that enforces information disclosure should satisfy the
following properties:
 budget balance,
 a rm at any point in time should be allowed to walk away from the mechanism.
That is, we face a design problem in which rms cannot commit to their future
actions,
 a rm should not walk away from the mechanism at some point and then come
back in the future to take advantage of the information accumulated during its
leave, and
 a dead-end outcome should be made public immediately upon its discovery with
no delay.
One particular issue with this type of mechanism is that if a rm walks away (o the
equilibrium path), the other rm is left wondering what the rm has actually observed
that made it leave; there is a myriad of o-path beliefs, and each belief can potentially
support a dierent continuation decentralized equilibrium play. Thus, the parameters of
the mechanism will depend on the specication of o-path beliefs. Note, however, that
this issue must emerge in any dynamic mechanism design problem where agents could
26receive new information over time when agents cannot commit to their plan of actions
at time 0.
The o-path beliefs have to be realistic and robust to perturbations. Indeed, we could
think of perturbation of rm strategies in the game-theoretic tradition of trembling-hand
perfection, or alternatively, we can think of a rare, random, exogenous shock that forces
a rm to leave the mechanism. In the latter case, exiting the mechanism becomes an
on-path behaviour and beliefs follow directly from standard Bayes' updating. These
considerations lead us to adopt the following specication of o-path beliefs.
 if a rm quits the mechanism at some point, which is o the equilibrium path,
then the other rm's belief does not suddenly change.
We shall design a mechanism with these properties. The mechanism simply states the
following: At any time t; each rm can report a failure they discovered to a mediator;
if rm n reports a failure, then rm  n will be liable to pay pt
n to rm n; and the
mechanism concludes. For example, rm n can deposit pt
n in a neutral account at time t
managed by the mediator. Our goal is to nd the range of pt
n that satises the incentive
conditions.
6.2 Incentives
Henceforth we shall restrict our attention to a constant price path such that pt
n = pn:
6.2.1 No-delay Condition
Suppose rm n has an unreported dead-end discovery at time t (this discovery can be
made right before t; or this discovery could have been made a while ago, which is o the
equilibrium path). If rm n reveals the failure, then besides pt
n it will get a continuation
payo wSS
n = n
+r (   c):
Reporting immediately at t should lead to a higher payo than delaying it to t + h





[ nc + n ( + pn) +  n (w
ss
n   p n)]d  pn + w
SS
n (13)
holds for any h > 0: Since pn  0, the RHS of (13) is strictly positive. Therefore,
whenever the integrand in the LHS is negative, then (13) holds trivially. If the integrand
27is strictly positive, the LHS is strictly increasing in h: Therefore, that (13) holds for any
h is equivalent to





 pn + w
SS
n :
If instead  nc + n ( + pn) +  n (wss
n   p n) > 0; then since the LHS of (13) is
increasing in h; (13) is equivalent to





 pn + w
SS
n :
This can be simplied into
n
 










+  n (p n + pn):





; and in the case of the opponent's discovery, rm n loses the transfer pn and
has to make an additional payment p n to the opponent. This is the RHS. Meanwhile,
the rm makes an additional gain, which is equal to the benet from monopolizing the
safe arm: n
 





n into the above expression and simplifying, we have
 nn
 + r
(   c)  ( n + r)pn +  np n: (14)
6.2.2 No Walk-away upon Discovery of a Dead End
At any time, a rm should not leave the mechanism to start a decentralized competition.
Let us denote rm n's value of walking away after the discovery of a failure at t as vS
n;t;
which is the value of monopolizing the safe arm until rm  n switches to the safe arm.
Note that for rm 1; vS
1;t = vS





















28For rm 2; vS
2;0  vS




























The value of sharing the information is wSS
n +pn: Therefore it must be that wSS
n +pn 
vS











2 (   c): (15)
6.2.3 Participation Constraint
The third condition is the participation constraint before any discovery. Let V D
n be rm

































The left-hand side is always V D
n since when rm n walks away before any discovery,
the game will resume as if the decentralized game has started at time t = 0 due to no
updating until that point in the centralized market. This condition can be simplied to
 
1   




















By Proposition 2, n
+r (0   c) + 
+rwSS
n on the right-hand side is rm n's payo Vn
under full information sharing. Therefore, the condition can be rewritten as
 
1   





This expression is very intuitive. The left-hand side is the expected net transfer rm n
receives from participating in the mechanism: there will be transfer only when the risky
arm has a dead end that occurs with a prior probability (1   0); on the equilibrium
path, the belief will never update because of full information sharing; rm n receives a
transfer pn at a rate n and makes a transfer p n at a rate  n; and hence, the discounted
29value of the net transfer on a dead-end arm is
npn  np n
+r : The right-hand side is the
value rm n gives up by participating in the mechanism: it obtains a value Vn under
full information sharing enforced by the mechanism, but V D
n in a decentralized market.









This condition holds for n = 1;2; and hence, we obtain an upper bound and a lower
bound for 1p1   2p2:
























2  V1 + V2:
The right-hand side is the rst-best joint payo under full information. The left-hand
side is the sum of values of the rms in the decentralized economy. Clearly, this condition
is always satised.
6.3 Ecient Mechanism




(   c)  ( n + r)pn +  np n; for n = 1;2: (16)









2 (   c): (17)
3. Participation constraint:
K  1p1   2p2  K: (18)
Theorem 2 Each price vector (p1;p2) that satises conditions (16) and (18) character-
izes a mechanism that restores eciency: both rms work on the risky research until
30a discovery is made and then switch to the safe research; rm n reports a dead-end
discovery immediately upon its discovery and receives a payment pn from its competitor.
Proof. Note that the set of price vectors (p1;p2) that satisfy (16)-(17) is non-empty.
Indeed, we can set p1 =
2p2+K
1 ; which satises (18): By setting p2 large enough, all other
constraints will be satised simultaneously. By denition, rms share their information
without delay under the mechanism with (p1;p2). The result then follows.
There is a continuum of price vectors that satisfy conditions (16)-(17): One way to
rene this set of price vectors is to introduce a liability constraint. Instead of pushing in
this direction, we characterize the \cheapest" prices that are enough to restore eciency.
To do this, we minimize the ow transfer 1p1 + 2p2 over all mechanisms.
6.4 Minimum Implementable Transfers




f1p1 + 2p2g subject to
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
C1:
12
+r (   c)  (1 + r)p2 + 1p1
C2:
12
+r (   c)  (2 + r)p1 + 2p2
C3:
12





(+r)2 (   c)  p2
C5: K  1p1   2p2  K:
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
:
The set of binding constraints in this program is determined by primitive parameter
values of c;n; r; ; 0 and : We present numerical solutions using the previous set of
parameters. The interesting nding is that the cost of the mechanism is quite minimal
relative to the size of the recovered welfare loss.
Minimum Price Mechanism





$ 1 $ 0.5 (50c /) $ 0.20 (20c /) $ 0.02 (2c /) $19.3 million
$ 1 million $ 0.5 million $ 0.2 million $ 0.02 million $19.6 million
$ 10 million $ 4.7 million $ 1.8 million $ 0.24 million $22 million
Table 5
In the numerical computations, the two binding constraints of the mechanism are
the no-delay condition for rm 1 (C1) and no-walk-away condition for rm 2 (C4).
31The following graph plots the prices dictated by the minimum transfer mechanism as a
function of the competition level on the safe research line.
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Two features stand out in the above plot. First, the price that each rm has to pay
to compensate its competitor is increasing in the level of the competition on the safe
research line. Second, the price that rm 1 receives (p1) is always higher than that of
rm 2, since sharing information on a dead-end nding means that both rms will now
compete on the safe arm. For rm 1 this entails a larger reduction in value because it
will then face a stronger competitor (rm 2).
7 Concluding Discussion and Extensions
The goal of this paper has been to uncover the potential ineciencies in research com-
petitions due to dead-end replication. We oered a parsimonious two-arm bandit model
with two asymmetric rms. We identied two types of ineciencies that arise in this
model and show that dierent rms incur dierent types of ineciencies. The eciency
loss is signicant, and we have discussed a simple mechanism to improve eciency. We
have made several simplifying assumptions to highlight the eects of dead-end discovery
and asymmetric information. In what follows, we shall discuss possible extensions of our
model and future research.
7.1 State-dependent Arrival Rate
In this paper, we have assumed that the arrival rate n is independent of the true state.
More generally, one might allow the arrival rate to be a function of the state as well, 
s
n;
where s 2 fG;Bg where G stands for the good risky arm and B stands for the dead-end





n; then rm n will learn from the fact that there is no discovery from its own




n; then for rm n; no news from its own research is
bad news. In this case, learning from n's own research and learning from the opponent's




n; then no news is good
news. Therefore, learning from n's own research and learning from the opponent tend
to push the learning in dierent directions. Our model isolates the endogenous learning
through competition from the exogenous learning. It remains to analyze which force
will be stronger and how they interact over time. We believe this complication will not
change the qualitative predictions of our model.
7.2 Strategic Patenting
In our model, a rm receives a lump-sum payo from its good discovery immediately.
We could enrich the model to study strategic patenting decisions and ask whether a rm
has an incentive to delay its patenting decision to its own benet. In this section, we
shall argue that the equilibrium we characterize is robust to an endogenous patenting
decision. Therefore, to study strategic patenting decisions, we need to enrich the model
(for example, by allowing multiple arrivals). This is an interesting question to ask but
is orthogonal to the current focus.
Assume rm  n's strategy is to patent its discovery immediately. Consider rm n:
If rm n has a non-patented successful discovery at a point when the other rm has
already switched, then there is no benet from delayed patenting, and a cost due to
discounting. Now consider the case where rm n has a non-patented discovery at t when
the competing rm is still working on the risky research (note that such a discovery
may be made exactly at tor it is discovered before but delayed until t). If n patents this
discovery at t; then we can derive its payo as Vt = +wSS
n : Suppose the rm decides to
delay it until t+s; for some s > 0: Since we know that the rm will not delay patenting
when the other rm has switched, we can assume without loss of generality that at t+s










































 (r+)s [ r    n (   )]:
Note that under Assumption 1;  >  and hence
@Vt;s
@s < 0: Therefore, rm n, if it has
a non-patented innovation at time t; will not delay patenting by any s > 0:
Remark 1 Note that we have just shown that it is optimal for rm n to patent immedi-
ately when rm  n's strategy is registering immediately whenever  > . The intuition
is that if rm n delays for dt; the cost of delay is of the order  n; yet the benet is
 n because rm n keeps rm  n away for dt:
7.3 Macroeconomic Applications
The increase in potentially wasteful R&D dollars has been a common concern both in
academic and policy spheres. Macro data on innovation and R&D spending in the US
exhibits a worrisome time-series pattern. The ratio of registered innovation counts to
total innovation eorts in the US has been steadily decreasing over time. The following
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Figure 6A Figure 6B
In gure 6A, we plot the ratio of the total number of USPTO patents granted to US
residents over aggregate R&D investment in the US. In the early 1950s, the patent-R&D
ratio was around 1.4 and it has decreased by almost 70% to 0.4 in the early 2000s. There
could be various explanations for this decline, and Kortum (1993) argues that one of
34them is the increasing duplicative R&D eorts by competing rms. He suggests that the
increase in market size leads to a larger ex-post value of innovation, which, combined
with competition, leads to a larger R&D spending per patent. A similar and even more
drastic picture emerges in the pharmaceutical industry. Figure 6B plots the number of
drug approvals per R&D investment for this industry. The ratio declines from 1.4 in
the early 1960s to 0.1 in the early 2000s, which is a decline of more than a 90%. This
observation again hints at a severe problem of R&D duplication for drug inventions.
We provide two comparative statics as a preliminary attempt to use our model to
touch on this issue. The rst one is the increase in the market value of drugs. Although
this increase in value could be caused by many dierent factors (increase in market size,
for instance), the end eect is an increase in the ex-post returns to innovation. In our
model, an increase in the market value of drugs leads to more experimentation on the
risky arm, which causes an increase in the cut-o value T of the weak rm 1. This
in turn also increases dead-end replications and reduces the number of drugs per R&D
investment. Figure 7A plots the average number of drugs per R&D investment as a
function of the market value.
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Figure 7A Figure 7B
Another potential explanation emerging from our model is the increase in uncertainty
or the decrease in the probability of a good outcome on the risky arm.21 To understand
this better, consider the case in which 0 = 1 and the decentralized equilibrium would
be ecient. As uncertainty increases (0 declines), the decentralized economy increases
the amount of dead-end replications. This increase in wasteful spending reduces the
number of drugs per R&D investment as illustrated in Figure 7B.
A more detailed analysis of the macroeconomic implications of the ineciencies iden-
tied in this paper requires incorporating the microeconomic structure into a formal
21In reality this could be caused due to the shing-out eect.
35general equilibrium growth model. Akcigit and Liu (2011) take a step in this direction.
We believe that additional interesting macroeconomic questions are still awaiting future
exploration.
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38Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
We begin with some useful observations. If the two rms start on the risky arm together,
continuing until a discovery is made, and then both switch to the safe arm, then their
joint value is given by the following HJB equation
















0   c + w
SS
: (19)















Note that V consists of two parts. Firms rst extract an expected payo wRR from the
risky arm, and meanwhile derive a ow payo wSS from the safe arm with eective
discounting  + r.
Proof of Proposition 2. We relax the rms' decision problem by allowing
reversibility; that is, they always have the option to restart a research line that they
previously quit. This relaxed problem makes the computation of the continuation payo
easier. In the relaxed problem, the joint value ^ V of the two rms can be derived from
the following HJB equation,
^ V = max
8
> > > > <






















e rdt   cdt + (1   dt) ^ V e rdt
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
(21)
where the four terms on the right side are the payos from strategies in which both rms
start with the risky arm, both rms start with the safe arm, rm 1 starts with the risky
arm and rm 2 starts with the safe arm, and rm 2 starts with the risky arm and rm
1 starts with the safe arm, respectively.









0 + r +    c
 + r
=  + w
RR:
Note that the inequality follows from Assumption 1. Therefore, the rst term on the
right side of (21) is the largest and hence






 rdt   cdt + (1   dt) ^ V e
 rdt:
This immediately implies that the optimal value of the relaxed problem, ^ V ; is achieved
by a strategy in which both rms start on the risky arm. This strategy is feasible in the
constrained problem where rms cannot switch back to a previously abandoned research
line. Therefore, this strategy is optimal in the original problem, and the optimal value







This completes the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 1
We conjecture that the dierential equation has a solution of the following form t =
	(t)  A















B + B nt = (1   A) n +  nBt:
Equating the constant terms we get B = (1   A) n: Moreover, we impose the boundary
condition 	(0) = 0: Then we get A = 0 and B = (1   0) n: This veries our
conjecture. 
40C Proofs of Theorem 1 and Proposition 3
We proceed in four steps. In step 1, we characterize the stopping time T: In step 2, we
show that both rms' stopping strategies are optimal. Last, step 3 proves the uniqueness.
Step 1: Characterization of the stopping time T:
Suppose at time t; rm n's belief on the risky arm is t
n and his belief on its opponent,
rm  n; is still on the risky arm is 
t
n: Recall from Equation (4) that wSS
n is rm n's
expected payo from competing with rm  n on the safe arm, wSS
n = n
+r (   c):
We dene vS
1 as the value of rm 1 when it is alone on the safe arm but anticipating
that the strong rm 2 might switch to the safe arm only after a discovery. Intuitively,
v
S

























In order for rm 1 to switch exactly at t; it must be that rm 1 is indierent between
switching at t or waiting until the next instant (we are assuming continuity of the value
function and this will be true). The payo from \stay on the risky research for another
dt and then switch" is
8
> > > > <












































> > > > =
> > > > ;
:
The rst line is rm 1's discounted expected return when it makes a discovery on the risky
arm during (t;t + dt): If the line is good, with probability t
1; it leads to an immediate
lump-sum payo  and a continuation payo of competing in the safe research, wSS
1 if the
line is bad, the dead-end discovery gives rise to a 0 immediate payo, but the expected
continuation payo depends on the position of the competitor. The second line is rm
1's discounted expected payo in the case where the opponent rm 2 discovers. It again
depends on the position of rm 2. If rm 2 is on the risky arm, which happens with
probability 
t
1; rm 1 will compete with rm 2. If rm 2 is on the safe arm, a discovery
on the safe arm indicates the risky arm is bad, and the game is over. The third line is
rm 1's discounted expected payo in the case of no discovery. The nal line is the cost
of researching.
41The payo from spending the next dt on the safe arm and staying there forever is
given by
(





















The interpretation is similar to the previous case.






























This condition carries the following intuition. At time t, spending an additional amount
of time dt on either arm delivers the same expected return conditional on an arrival of
an outcome. To see this, note that the RHS is simply the expected return from the safe
arm. The LHS is the expected return on the risky arm. With probability t
1; the arm is
good, in which case rm 1 receives the patent value  and competes with rm 2 in the
safe arm and obtains wSS
1 : With the remaining probability (1   t
1) the arm is bad, in
which case, rm 1 switches secretly to the safe arm and obtains a payo depending on
whether rm 2 is already on the safe arm or not.
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42Remark 2 (Proposition 3) From the explicit expression for T above, it is easy to
check T is increasing in 0 and ; and decreasing in r; 2 and : The comparative static
relative to 1 is ambiguous.
Step 2: Best responses of the stopping times in the candidate equilibrium.
In this part, we show that the two rms' stopping times are best responses to each
other, given that both start on the risky research line. In Step 4, after we introduced the
idea of an auxiliary problem, we shall show that the initial choices of the risky research
line are mutual best responses in the candidate equilibrium.
Assume rm 2 does not stop the risky research before a discovery. Recall that T is






















That is, T uniquely solves
0
1 + (1   0)2t
 +
(1   0)











We know the LHS is monotone decreasing in t: Hence if t < T; rm 1 strictly prefers
to stay in the risky arm, and if t > T; the rm strictly prefers to quit. Therefore, it is
optimal for rm n to stop at t = T before a discovery is found.
Now assume rm 1 uses the stopping strategy characterized by T. Consider rm 2:
There are two cases to consider.
Case 2.1: At t  T; rm 2's payo conditional on being on the risky arm in the
candidate equilibrium is given by the recursion:


















+ (1   dt)V2

:
Note that since T
1   c  0 (otherwise, rm 1 would have already switched to the safe
arm before T), T






















In order for rm 2 to stay on the risky research, we need V2  wSS
2 : Plugging in param-













































Note that at the time of the cuto, the beliefs are such that T
2 > T
1: A lower bound
for T
1 is described as follows. Consider the same belief updating procedure for rm 1,
but now the payos are in such a way that the return on the risky arm is higher and
the return on the safe arm is lower. This will give us a lower bound for T
1 since in
this environment, rm 1 will need a lower belief than the actual game to switch. To
generate this payo structure, assume rm 1 does not face any competition in the risky
arm but faces competition with certainty on the safe arm (continuing with the same
belief updating). In that case the indierence condition in (23) reads as

T
















Therefore a sucient condition for (24) is

T










Using the expression for T
1 , the sucient condition becomes
(2   1)(   c)
r + 
+
1 (   c)
r + 
 0:
This sucient condition always holds.
Case 2.2: We need to show that rm 2 does not want to switch at any t < T: To
this end, suppose to the contrary that rm 2 switches at t < T while rm 1 follows the
prescribed equilibrium strategy. Consider rm 2's response to the following strategy:
Firm 1 follows the candidate equilibrium strategy prescribed for rm 2.
44If rm 2 has an incentive to switch at t < T in the candidate equilibrium, it has
an even stronger incentive to switch before t against the alternative strategy for rm
1 prescribed above. The reason is that the alternative strategy of rm 1 increases the
competition of the risky arm and reduces the competition on the safe arm. We shall
derive a contradiction as follows.
Given rm 1's alternative strategy, rm 2's belief goes down continuously over time
before a discovery is observed, and hence there exists T2 at which an indierence condi-






















We claim that T2 > T: To see this, suppose to the contrary that T  T2: Then the

















































































































Suppose to the contrary that there are other equilibria with stopping time T1 and
T2: Since 0 > ; we know T1 > 0 and T2 > 0: We have two cases to consider.
Case 3.1: +1  T1 > T2:
We dene vS
2 (T2;T1) as the value of rm 2 at T2 when it switches to the safe arm
but anticipating that rm 1 might switch to the safe arm only after a discovery or at
45the random time 1:
First note that T2 < +1 because of belief updating. In order for rm 2 to switch
exactly at T2; it must be that rm 2 is indierent between switching at T2 or waiting
until the next instant and then switching. The payo from \staying on the risky research
for another dt;" is
8
> > > > <
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> > > > ;
:
The payo from \spend the next dt on the safe arm and stay there forever," is given
by
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2 = : (26)
Notice that vS
2 (T2;T2) = wSS
2  vS
2 (T2;T1) for any T1 > T2: Then (26) gives us
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2 )(1   0)1
: (27)
Now consider rm 1: Firm 1's belief on the risky arm does not update after T2; and
































1    c +
1
















1    c +
1













1 (   c)
 + r
:
This condition can be simplied to
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#
> 2   1: (29)
First, since    c > 0; we have
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Case 3.2: +1 > T2  T1: In this case, rm 2 does not update its belief after T1 if it
does not observe anything on the risky arm. Therefore, for rm 2 to switch at T2  T1;
it must be that rm 2 is indierent between switching at T1 (competing with rm 1 on
the safe arm) and staying on the risky arm (monopolizing the risky arm with the option
value of the safe arm) at any t  T1: Following the argument in the previous case, the




















































1+(1 0) nT; the LHS of the previous equation is strictly decreasing







































































In our equilibrium, rm 2 prefers to stay on the risky arm after T1 > T upon no
discovery and its belief is T























But at t = T1 in the supposed equilibrium with stopping times +1 > T2 > T1; we have
for rm 2 (which is indierent between staying on the risky arm until a discovery or














































where the strict inequality follows because T
2 < 
T1
2 : This is a contradiction.
D Details of the Numerical Example
Our model has 7 structural parameters: r; 0; ; ; c; 1 and 2: We take the annual
interest rate to be r = 5%. According to PhRMA (2011) only one out of six drug candi-
dates survives the clinical stage; thus, we set 0 = 1=6: The remaining ve parameters
are calibrated to the relevant moments from the data.
Our strategy is to calibrate the model to the clinical trial stage of the pharmaceutical
research during the late 1990s. The analysis requires the empirical characterization
of two asymmetric rms. For this purpose, we use the population of pharmaceutical
companies in Compustat in 2000. Since the strength of the rms is determined by the
R&D spendings in our model, we rank the rms in the Compustat sample according to
their R&D investments in 2000. We form the strong rm by averaging the numbers of
the top 3% companies in Compustat. Similarly, the weak rm is formed by averaging
the second top 3% percent companies. The following table summarizes the empirical
target moments and their data sources22:
Some Key Facts on Pharmaceutical R&D and Calibration Targets
Moment Description Data Model
zAverage time to develop a drug 10-15 years 14.8 years
zFraction of candidate drugs that survive the clinical trial 1/6 1/6
Net present value of a drug $1.4 billion $1.4 billion
Average cost to develop a drug $480 million $496 million
xRatio of R&D spendings 2.5 2.5
xRatio of prots 2.5 2.9
22zObtained from PhRMA (2011). Obtained from Grabowski, Vernon and DiMasi (2002). xObtained
from Compustat (dnum=2834) for 2005. Ratios are dened as the strong rm's moment divided by
the weak rm's moment. Prots are computed as: Revenue-R&D-Cost of goods sold. Rate of return
to R&D is the ratio of prot to R&D.
49Note that our calibrated model delivers a cuto time T = 36; which means that the weak
rm experiments in the risky research line for 36 months as long as it neither receives
an outcome from its own research eort nor observes a patent from the competitor
rm. As discussed in the main text, this is one of the key sources of ineciency in this
competition.
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In the main text, we have assumed that the game starts on the risky arm. This
section considers a model in which both rms have no research activity before t = 0;
and simultaneously, right at t = 0; each of them has to decide which arm to take to start
the game. In particular, a rm can start on the safe arm and then switch to the risky
arm, or it could choose not to research at all.
Theorem 3 The equilibrium described in Theorem 1 in the main text is the unique pure
strategy equilibrium when rms can choose the initial starting arm freely, provided that






Proof Given the proof for Theorem 1, we need to show two additional claims. In Step 1
below, we shall show that there is no equilibrium in which either player starts with
the safe research line. In Step 2 below, we verify that the initial choices of the risky
arm are best responses to each other in the candidate equilibrium. In particular,
we need to verify that the following deviation is unprotable for a rm: start on
the safe arm with a hope that it can make a discovery before T, which will fool
the opponent into thinking that the risky arm had already been discovered to be a
dead end; hence the opponent is misled into quitting the entire game, leaving the
risky arm to the deviating rm. This deviation is not possible in our benchmark
model as a rm cannot return to the risky arm there.
Step 1: We shall also show that there is no equilibrium in which either player starts







. There are several cases to
consider.
1Case 1.1: Both rms start on the safe arm, with stopping times T1;T2 2 (0;+1];
respectively. We claim that T1 = T2 = T  2 (0;+1]: Suppose for the purpose of
contradiction that Tn > T n; then upon no observation of discovery from T n on, rm
n's belief will become more pessimistic over time. Consequently, if rm n does not
want to switch at T n upon no discovery, it will not switch at any future time upon no
discovery. That is, Tn = 1: Now, we have a situation in which rm n works on the
safe arm until a discovery and rm  n starts with the safe arm but switches at T n:
Since rm  n's belief on the risky arm will never get updated, the rm should instead
start with the risky arm at t = 0: A contradiction. Hence the only possibility left is
Tn = T n > T  2 (0;+1]:






















n is rm n's expected payo of competing with rm  n on the risky research
with 0 outside options (because the outcome on the safe arm has been discovered).
Now x rm  n's strategy and consider a deviation of rm n of starting with the























The reason for V d
n being a lower bound is that conditional on no discovery up to time
T ; the continuation payo for rm n is at least vRR
n because rm n still has the option










































Since rms' total payo with competition on the risky arm without the option of the safe







2Hence for at least one n = 1;2; vRR
n <
n(0 c)
+c : For this n; we have
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Hence, for this rm n; deviation is protable.
Case 1.2: Firm n starts on the safe arm with stopping time Tn 2 (0;+1]: Firm  n
starts on the risky arm, with stopping time T n;0 2 (0;+1]; and T n;1  0 (the second
stopping time is for the stage in which rm n discovers on the safe arm).
Consider the subgame right after rm n takes the safe arm. We modify rm n's
problem as follows:
(a) Fix rm  n's strategy as staying on the risky arm forever until a discovery is
observed on the risky arm. Let e Tn be rm n's one optimal stopping time in this
auxiliary problem. We claim that in this auxiliary problem we can take e Tn > 0.
Indeed, e Tn  Tn: The reason is that this modication makes staying on the safe arm
for any t > 0 more attractive than in the original problem (the potential benet
from the risky arm is reduced while the benet from the safe arm is increased
because rm n will face less competition there).
(b) On top of (a), ask rm  n to reveal its discovery (including the dead-end nding)
until rm n leaves the safe arm.23 Hence, at any t; by which no discovery is made,
there is no belief updating. Therefore, if rm n starts with the safe arm in the
auxiliary problem (a), then it will always stay on the safe arm before a discovery.
Let V RR
n be rm n's payo upon switching to the risky arm in the auxiliary problem































23Note that we construct this articial problem for rm n where rm  n's strategy is superimposed
exogenously. This should not be confused with the observability assumption in the original problem.
3Because rm  n's strategy is exogenously xed as in (a), V RR
n is independent of :
Consider an alternative strategy for rm n in the auxiliary problem (b): abandon



















which is equivalent to







 + r +  n

:
Note that V RR
n  0 n( c)
+r   (1   0) nc
n+r: Hence, a sucient condition for the above
expression is
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Therefore, under the above condition, working on the safe arm is not optimal.
Step 2: Best responses of the initial choices in the candidate equilibrium.
We shall utilize the idea of the auxiliary problems in Step 1. Suppose rm n has a
4protable deviation that consists of starting on the safe arm with stopping time ~ Tn 2
(0;+1]: Now in the auxiliary problem (a) the deviation is even more desirable for the
same reason we articulated before. Now consider auxiliary problem (b) in addition. Since
there is no updating before rm n switches back to the risky arm, taking ~ Tn = +1 is
also necessarily a protable deviation. Therefore, the same condition in Step 1 will
apply.
5